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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
hide behind the protective provisions of the Workmen's Compensation
Act." 20
While the present decision was equitable in that a holding to the
contrary would have limited recovery to funeral expenses,2 1 the far-reaching
effects of the decision might bring future inequities. That a child may be
forced to pursue his common law remedy is evident, and it appears that
the court in deciding the instant case in a just manner has assumed the
prerogative of legislation.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - INJURY BY ACCIDENT
STRAIN AND EXERTION

i

Claimant, a waitress, while in the course of her employment, received

an arm injury by lifting a heavy container. She seeks recovery under the
Florida Workmen's Compensation Act.1 Held, that claimant is entitled
to compensation. An unexpected injury received in the usual performance
of an ordinary duty falls within the meaning of "injury by accident."
Bonnie Gray Y. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co., --So.2d
- (Fla. 1952).*
The term "accident" has been a part of Workmen's Compensation
law since its adoption in England in 1897,2 and is to be found in most
compensation statutes today.' The states which have not adopted the
term by statute have done so by judicial interpretation.4 "Accident" has
been defined as an unexpected incident which occurs unintentionally.5
The Florida act, in particular, provides that an "accident" is "an unexpected or unusual event, happening suddenly."' No stated period can
be termed "sudden" as it depends upon the circumstances of each case.7
Two elements have been held to be necessary for an accident: (1) an
unexpected cause,8 such as a slip, fall or misstep9 and (2) an unexpected
20. Smith v. Arnold, 60 So.2d 281, 283 (Fla. 1952).
21. The parents were certainly not dependent on the child.
*Editor's note: This case is scheduled for rehearing and has not been reported
by publication deadline.
1. FLA.

440.01 et seq. (1949).

STAT. §

2. Burton, The Dilemma of Accident In Workmen's Compensation Laws (Address
at the Tenth Annual Meeting of the American Association of State Compensation Insurance Funds, Miami Beach, Florida, November 1952).
3. 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw 511 § 37.10 (found that "accident"
appears as a noun or modifier in forty-two Workmen's Compensation Act statutes).

4. See note 2 supra.
5. 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 3, § 37.00;
1951).

6. FLA.

STAT.

§ 440.02 (19)

(1949); Burton, Florida Workmen's Compensation

1935 to 1950, 5 MIAMI L.Q. 81, § IV (1950).
7.
8.
9.
(1945),

Kress & Co. v. Burkes,
See note, 17 FLA. L.J.
Compare Cleary Bros.
with Davis v. Artley

BrAcx, LAw DICTIONARY 30 (4th ed

153 Fla. 868, 16 So.2d 106 (1944).
28 (1943).
Construction Co. v. Nobles, 156 Fla. 408, 23 So.2d 525
Construction Co., 154 Fla. 481, 18 So.2d 255 (1944).
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result. 10 However, the present trend has been to modify the rule so that
only (2) is necessary."
By statute, the term "injury" means personal injury by accident. 12
"Injury by accident" covers injuries, the means or cause of which are accidents, or which are accidents in themselves.'3 Thus the phrases "injury
by accident" and "accidental injury" mean nothing more than "accident"
4
as used in the popular sense.'
Where the disease of a claimant causes an accident which results in
an injury, there will be no compensation awarded.' 5 However, where the
accident or the event aggravates a pre-existing disease, and occurs under
such conditions that relief would have been granted had no disease been
Where an employee sustains
involved, compensation will be granted.'
exposure greater than that of the general public, a resulting accident is held
to be compensable.' 7 All courts agree that where there is a slip, fall or
misstep, and an injury results, it will be compensable.' 8 It is in the lifting
and overexertion cases where the major problem arises. It has been held
that a heart attack,' cerebral hemorrhage,201 injured knee,21 back 22or any
other injury not brought on by a strained or awkward position 3 connected
with the employment, is not an accidental injury.
Florida, prior to the immediate case, required in most instances that
Contra: Duff Hotel v. Ficara, 150 Fla. 422, 7 So.2d 790 (1942) (lifting injury held
accident).
10. Tallahassee v, Roberts, 155 Fla. 815, 21 So.2d 712 (1915) (nothing unusual
happened; held no accident); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Shepard, 155 Fla. 576, 20 So.2d
903 (1945); Duff Hotel v. Ficara, 150 Fla. 422, 7 So.2d 790 (1942); Lakeland v. Burton,
147 Fla. 412, 2 So.2d 731 (1941).
11. Bonnie Gray v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co., So.2d (Fla. 1952).
12. FLA. STAT. § 440.02 (6) (1949).
13. HOROVITZ, CURRENT TRENDS IN BASIC PRINCIPLES OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-

TiON 495 (1947).
14. Clover, Clayton & Co. v. Hughes, (1910) A.C. 242; 3 B.W.C.C. 275, 282; 1
LARSON, op. cit. supra note 3, at 513 § 37.20.
15. See Cleary Bros. Construction Co. v. Nobles, 156 Fla. 408, 23 So.2d 525 (1945)
(physical condition because of disease was such that slight exertion might have produced
the same result).
16. Davis v. Artley Construction Co., 154 Fla. 481, 18 So.2d 255 (1944) (diseased
employee received an injury which caused his death earlier than it would have occurred
had the disease progressed naturally); Protectu Awning Shutter Co. v. Cline, 154 Fla. 30,
16 So.2d 342 (1944); Charles A. Stewart Co. v. Dobson, 153 Fla. 693, 15 So.2d 481
(1943); Allen v. Maxwell Co., 152 Fla. 340, 11 So.2d 572 (1943). See dissent, United
tates Casualty Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 55 So.2d 741, 746 (Fla. 1951). See I
SCHNEIDER, WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION LAw 517 § 138 (2nd ed. 1932).
17. See Davis v. Artley Construction Co., 154 Fla. 481, 18 So.2d 255 (1944) (workman became ill while working in a hot box car); Alexander Orr Jr., Inc. v. Florida Industrial Commission, 129 Fla. 369, 176 So. 172 (1937) (plumber suffered from heat exhaustion while using a blow torch).
18. See note 2 supra.
19. Le Viness v. Mauer, 53 So.2d 113 (Fla. 1951).

20. Compare note, 3 FLA. L. Rxv. 390 (1950), with Davis v. Artley Construction
Co,, 154 Fla. 481, 18 So.2d 255 (1944).
21. Peterson v. City Commission, 44 So.2d 423 (Fla. 1950).
22. Compare McNeill v. Thompson, 53 So.2d 868 (Fla. 1951), with Crawford v.
Benrus Market, 40 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1949).
23. McNeill v. Thompson, 53 So.2d 868 (Fla. 1951).

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
there be an accident precedent to the injury before compensation would
be awarded. 24 The reason advanced for this line of decisions is that the
legislature intended that the benfits of the act should be limikd, not
tantamount to the expansive provisions of accident and health insurance
policies. 25 Furthermore, the legislature, by defining and framing the
terms "accident"2 0 and "injury"2 7 under separate paragraphs, has indicated
that they are independent terms and that there should be a distinction
between them.28 There is support for the proposition that the accident
is the cause and the injury the effect; never is the effect the cause. 29

The opposite view, that the injury can be simultaneous with the
accident, was first expressed in Fenton v. Thorley,30 one of the forerunners
of workmen's compensation decisions, wherein it was said that the word
"accident" is used to denote both the cause and the effect. Perhaps the
contra decisions were reached because the courts failed to recognize that
in lifting and exertion injuries, the cause and result.are simultaneous, and
that there is an internal, instead of the usual external, injury.3'
The court in the present case, following the majority view, held
that to prove an accident the claimant only need show that there was an
unexpected result.8 2 The theory is that the court in the past in stating
that the injury itself could not suffice for, or constitute, the accident, 3
intended only to require the showing of some event or circumstance related to the claimant's work to which his injury would be directly attributed.
By holding that an injury in itself can constitute an accident, the
Florida Supreme Court has made compensation available for many persons
who previously could not collect for their injuries of strain and exertion
34
under the Florida Workmen's Compensation Act.
24. MeNeill v. Thompson, 53 So.2d 868 (Fla. 1951); Le Vincss v. Maurer, 53 So.2d

113 (Fla. 1951); Brooks-Scanlon v. Lee, 44 So.2d 650 (Fla. 1950); Peterson v. City Commission, 44 So.2d 423 (Fla. 1950); Tallahassee v. Roberts, 155 Fla. 815, 21 So.2d 712
(1945) (compensation denied when fireman slipped vertebra leaving bed to answer fire
alarm); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Shepard, 155 Fla. 576, 20 So.2d 903 (1945); General
Properties Co. v. Greening, 154 Fla. 814, 18 So.2d 908 (1944); Kress & Co. v. Burkes, 153
Fla. 868, 16 So.2d 106 (1944).
25. See Peterson v. City Comhnission, 44 So.2d 423, 425 (Fla. 1950) (dissenting opinion); General Properties Co. v. Greening, 154 fla. 814, 18 So.2d 908 (1944); Protectu
Awning Shutter Co, v. Cline, 154 Fla. 30, 16 So.2d 342 (1944).

26. See note 6 supra.
27. See note 12 supra.
28. Brief for Appellees, pp. 9, 12, 13, BonnieGray v. Employers Mutual Liability
Insurance Co., note 11 supra.
29. Id. at 12.
30. (1903) A.C. 443; 5 B.W.C.C. 1.
31. See note 2 supra.
32. Accord: Duff Hotel v. Ficara, 150 Fla. 422, 7 So.2d 790 (1942).
33. McNeill v. Thompson, 53 So.2d 868 (Fla. 1951); Le Viness v. Mauer, 53 So.2d
113 (Fla. 1951); Brooks-Scanlon v. Lee, 44 So.2d 650 (Fla. 1950); Peterson v. City
Commission, 44 So.2d 423 (Fla. 1950).
34. See note 2 supra (estimated that ninety percent of the strain and exertion cases
in Florida had been denied to date).

